

Magnolia Disclosures

Version 6.2.3

Environment:

- Magnolia 6.2.3
- Ubuntu Linux

Findings:

1. CVE-2021-46363: Formula Injection in Content Translation

Description:

The export functions in “Content Translation” does not sanitize potentially malicious Formulas. In a worst-case scenario, these formulas may result in arbitrary code execution on a victim’s computer when opening the exported files with Microsoft Excel.

Proof of Concept:


In order to leverage this vulnerability an attacker will need to find a way to insert malicious formula elements in the content of translation files. This can be achieved by:

1.1. Directly importing a malicious translation file:

Content of malicious CSV:


```
"Modification date of page","Key","Link to page","Title","Default language (en)","de"
"2020.10.19 22:01:36 672","05872876-073e-40a3-a3c5-0d0a18c1d43d:title","http://travel-
demo.magnolia-cms.com/tour-type.html","Page properties: Page title","Tour Types","mal"
"2020.10.19 22:01:36 672","05872876-073e-40a3-a3c5-
0d0a18c1d43d:navigationTitle","http://travel-demo.magnolia-cms.com/tour-type.html","Page
properties: Navigation title","Tours","=cmd|'/C calc.exe'!A1"
```

Import the above CSV:




1.2. Modifying Page properties:

In this example we will modify the page title:





Both these scenarios will result in files containing Malicious Formulas injected into the exported translations. The following export formats are potentially vulnerable:



When the exported files are opened in Microsoft Excel the following behavior occurs:

- **CSV and Google CSV:**

When opening the malicious exported CSV file in Excel, the vulnerability will trigger automatically:



- **XLS:**

In this scenario the formula will not trigger automatically when the file is open, but the user is at risk if he/she interacts in special ways with the formula (E.g. interacting with it in the "Formula Bar"):

